📇 ACCT 3233/7233 Exam Notecards — Print on 4×6 index cards (landscape)

IIA 2024 Standards — Architecture & Domain I & II Overview 1 / 14
5 Domains · 15 Principles · 52 Standards
Old "Attribute" + "Performance" categories → ELIMINATED
DomainFocus
I PurposeWhy we exist
II EthicsHow we behave
III GoverningBoard & CAE relationship
IV ManagingStrategy & resources
V PerformingThe actual work
Domain I Purpose — 4 Services:
Assurance – independent evaluation of controls/risk/governance
Advice – recommendations to improve operations
Insight – deeper understanding of processes & risks
Foresight – anticipating emerging risks ⭐ NEW 2024

Goal: create, protect, and sustain value

Domain II — 5 Ethics Principles

P#PrinciplePhilosopher
P1IntegrityKant — categorical imperative
P2ObjectivityHusserl — epoché (bracket assumptions)
P3CompetencyAristotle — phronesis (practical wisdom)
P4Due Prof. CareHume — can't test everything
P5ConfidentialityBreach once → never candid again
P1 Integrity Key: Std 1.1 — truthful, accurate, no omissions; CAE must support auditors expressing unfavorable findings. Pressure to "reframe" = integrity test.
P2 Objectivity Key: Most dangerous bias = confirmation bias — actively seek disconfirming evidence.
P3 Competency Key: Know what you don't know. Use specialists. Dangerous auditor = "took a webinar."
IIA Standards — Domains III, IV & V 2 / 14

Domain III — Governing (MOST CHANGED)

  • P6 Authorized by Board — charter = source of authority
  • P7 Positioned Independently — CAE reports functionally to board; structural (not just attitudinal)
  • P8 Overseen by Board — board approves plan, budget, resources; they are accountable too

Defines "Essential Conditions" boards must provide.


Domain IV — Managing

  • P9 Plan Strategically — risk-based, dynamic (no more "audit every 3 years" cyclical)
  • P10 Manage Resources — document when insufficient
  • P11 Communicate Effectively — bidirectional; listen as much as inform
  • P12 Enhance Quality — QAIP required; EQA every 5 years, at least 1 active CIA (Std 12.4)

Domain V — Performing Services

  • P13 Plan Engagements — understand activity, risk assessment, define scope
  • P14 Conduct Work — gather evidence, Four C's, recommendations, conclusions
  • P15 Communicate & Monitor — no surprises; confirm implementation; follow-up

⚠️ New term: "conclusion" replaces "opinion"


⭐ Four C's of Findings:
Condition — what IS (actual situation found)
Criteria — what SHOULD BE (the standard/policy)
Cause — WHY the gap exists (root cause)
Consequence — WHY it matters (risk/impact)

Engagement Effort Split:
Planning20–30%
Fieldwork40–50%
Reporting15–20%
F/UOngoing

Most failures = planning failures. No surprises in final report = you've talked to mgmt first.

Three Lines Model · Assurance vs Advisory · Topical Requirements 3 / 14

Three Lines Model

LineWhoRole
1stManagementOwns risk & controls day-to-day
2ndRisk & ComplianceSupports, monitors, provides expertise
3rdInternal AuditIndependent assurance → board
GovBoardAccountability to stakeholders

IA can rely on 2nd line but must independently verify before reporting conclusions.


Assurance vs Advisory

AssuranceAdvisory
Parties3 (auditor, auditee, stakeholders)2 (auditor + client)
ScopeAuditor setsClient sets
OutputFormal conclusionRecommendations
PostureSkepticismCollaboration

⚠️ Advisory on a process may impair objectivity for future assurance (Std 7.2)

Topical Requirements (New 2024 IPPF)

Mandatory when in scope. Effective 12 months after issuance. Must document which apply + rationale for exclusions.

TopicKey Focus
CybersecurityGovernance, risk, controls, incident response
IT GovernanceTech strategy, performance, risk
Privacy Risk MgmtGDPR, CCPA, privacy by design
Third-Party MgmtVendor risk, due diligence, monitoring
Sustainability/ESGClimate, supply chain, DEI metrics
Heidegger's Aletheia (ἀλήθεια) = un-concealment / truth. An audit finding is an act of unconcealment — bringing hidden things into the open. The auditor's job: make the invisible visible.

"The unexamined organization is not worth working for." — with apologies to Socrates

CIA Triad · Why Cyber Risk Is Different · Attack Surface 4 / 14

CIA Triad

ObjectiveProtects againstThreats
ConfidentialityUnauthorized disclosureBreaches, eavesdropping, unauthorized access
IntegrityUnauthorized modificationTampering, malware, MITM attacks
AvailabilityDisruptionDDoS, ransomware, system failures

Every control should map to ≥1 CIA objective. If it doesn't — question why it exists.


Why Cyber Risk Is Different

AdversarialIntelligent actor actively probes & adapts
AsymmetricAttacker needs 1 weakness; defender must protect ALL
EvolvingThreat changes daily, not annually
InvisibleBreaches often undetected for months
InterconnectedYour security = your vendors' security (supply chain)

Market volatility doesn't try to defeat your hedging strategy. Cyber attackers do.

Modern Enterprise Attack Surfaces

  • On-Premises — data centers, legacy systems, poorly documented
  • Cloud — IaaS/PaaS/SaaS; shared responsibility; shadow IT
  • Endpoints — laptops, mobile, IoT, printers, cameras; each = entry point
  • Third-Party — vendors, APIs; your security = weakest vendor
  • Identity & Access — AD, SSO, MFA, privileged accounts; "keys to kingdom"
  • Invisible Layer — shadow IT, forgotten test systems; what you don't know CAN hurt you
Clausewitz: Defense is stronger — but only if you know where to defend. In cyber, the perimeter is everywhere.
Rumsfeld: Shadow IT = known unknown. Zero-days = unknown unknowns.

Risk-based prioritization: What is most critical? Most exposed? Would hurt most if compromised?

Defense in Depth · 4 Organizational Pathologies 5 / 14

Defense in Depth — Control Types

TypeExamples
PreventiveFirewalls, access controls, encryption, patching, security training
DetectiveSIEM, IDS/IPS, log monitoring, anomaly detection, threat hunting
CorrectiveIncident response, backup/restore, disaster recovery, forensics

Layers: Network → Endpoint → Application → Data → Human → Governance

Human layer = often weakest AND strongest. Vigilant employees catch what tools miss.


IIA Cybersecurity Topical Req — 3 Domains:
Governance — does leadership own cybersecurity?
Risk Management — do they know what they're protecting?
Controls — are the controls actually working?
Released: Feb 5, 2025 · Effective: Feb 5, 2026 · Maps to NIST & COBIT

4 Organizational Pathologies

#PathologyKey Example / Audit Q
1Ownership Gap — unowned systems don't get patchedTarget 2013: HVAC vendor. "Show me who owns this system and prove they know it."
2Security vs. Business — speed vs. control; CISO reporting line matters"Show me a project where security delayed launch. What happened?"
3Compliance Trap — compliance ≠ securityEquifax, Target, Capital One all PCI compliant when breached. Attackers don't check compliance status.
4Learned Helplessness — "if they want in they'll get in" fatalismVerizon DBIR: stolen credentials + phishing + unpatched systems cause MOST breaches. Fundamentals > exotic attacks.
Stoic wisdom: Focus on what you can control. Can't stop nation-states — but can stop 95% of attacks through fundamentals: patching, MFA, phishing awareness, asset mgmt.
ITGC Testing — Positive/Negative · Test of Design · Design vs OE Failures 6 / 14

Positive vs. Negative Testing

✅ Positive Testing

"Did the control work when it should?"

Testing the happy path

Verify approvals, timelines, documentation

🚫 Negative Testing

"Did the control BLOCK what it should?"

Testing the guardrails

Can terminated users log in? Self-approve? SoD blocked?

⚠️ Positive testing ALONE creates false confidence. A control that approves everything correctly is useless if it blocks nothing.

Test of Design (TOD) — "The Blueprint Test"

"If everyone followed this perfectly, would it prevent/detect the risk?"

PrecisionSpecific enough? "Manager approval" vs. "Direct mgr via ServiceNow within 24h with justification"
CompletenessAll scenarios? Contractors? Emergency? Transfers?
AuthorityRight people? Clerk approving exec access?

Design Failure vs. OE Failure

Design FailureOE Failure
WhatControl CAN'T workControl DIDN'T work
WhyFlawed blueprint: policy gap, wrong approvers, no SLAGood design, bad execution: approval skipped, SLA breached
RemedyProcess/policy redesignTraining, monitoring, automation
⚠️ CRITICAL: Don't prescribe training for a design problem. Classification drives the right recommendation.

Tick Marks (must define in legend)

Tested, no exception
Exception identified
T Traced/Tied to source
R Recalculated
I Inquiry (confirmed verbally)
Inspected original doc

Golden Rule: If you can't point to a specific exhibit/row/doc for every fact → not documented properly.

ITGC Sampling — Methods · Sample Size Table (AICPA/PCAOB) 7 / 14

Sampling Methods

MethodUse WhenLimitation
RandomLarge, homogeneous populationsMay miss high-risk by chance
StratifiedHeterogeneous pop. with risk strataMust understand risk factors
HaphazardSmall populations; preliminary testingNOT statistically valid; unconscious bias
Census (100%)Critical controls; small populations; high-riskTime-consuming
⭐ Best Practice: Combine methods — Stratified/Random for general pop. + Census (100%) for:
  • Privileged users
  • SoD conflicts
  • Emergency access (break-glass)

Required Sampling Documentation

  1. Population source (where data came from)
  2. Population completeness verification
  3. Selection criteria applied
  4. Sample size rationale (why this number)
  5. Selection method (random seed, every Nth, etc.)
  6. Sample listing with unique identifiers

Reviewer's Test: Could another auditor recreate your exact sample?

⭐ Sample Size Table (AICPA/PCAOB)

FrequencyLowModHigh
Annual (1)111
Quarterly (4)22–34
Monthly (12)2–34–68–12
Weekly (52)5–910–1520–25
Daily (250+)10–1520–3040–60
Per occurrence254060
Factors that INCREASE sample size:
↑ Risk level · ↑ Expected deviations · ↑ Desired confidence · ↑ Prior year exceptions

Stratification Example (Meridian Case)

PopulationRiskMethodSample
Privileged usersCriticalCensus100%
SoD conflictsCriticalCensus100%
New provisioningHighStratified60
TerminationsHighStratified52
ModificationsMediumRandom45
ITGC Risk Ratings · Finding Structure 8 / 14

Risk Ratings — External (SOX/PCAOB)

RatingDefinitionConsequence
Material WeaknessReasonable possibility material misstatement NOT prevented/detectedAdverse ICFR opinion
Sig. DeficiencyLess than MW but merits oversight attentionReport to Audit Committee
Ctrl DeficiencyDesign/operation gap; may not reach SD/MW thresholdManagement letter
Internal (IIA) Remediation Timelines:
🔴 Critical / High → 30 days  |  🟡 Medium → 60–90 days  |  🟢 Low → 6 months

Finding Structure Comparison

External (Mgmt Letter)Internal (IA Finding)
StructureCondition → Criteria → Cause → Effect → Rec.Title → Background → Observation → Risk → Rec. + Owner + Due Date + Mgmt Response
ToneFormal, regulatoryCollaborative, advisory
Specificity"Certain users" (vague)Named individuals, specific data points
AudienceAudit Committee / regulatorsManagement + CAE + Board
Key Distinction: External findings protect the auditor legally — vague by design. Internal findings are actionable by design — specific names, dates, and owners required.
8 Rules for Audit Reporting Excellence 9 / 14
RuleWhat It Means
1. Lead with headlineException rate goes first — "2 of 60 (3.3%) had exceptions"
2. Quantify everythingNever "several" or "many" → always "3 of 127 (2.4%)"
3. Fact vs. judgment"16 hrs elapsed" = fact · "deficiency" = judgment · label each clearly
4. Define your populationState the universe: "Of 412 new provisioning events during the test period…"
RuleWhat It Means
5. Show your math"16.75 hrs (Fri 5pm → Sat 9:45am) vs. 4-hr SLA" — never assert without the calculation
6. Compensating controlsAcknowledge them: "No unauthorized access confirmed via sign-in logs" = credibility
7. Actionable recsNot "improve controls" → "implement real-time Workday-to-Entra sync by Q2"
8. Write for the skepticPre-answer every "how do you know?" — assume the reviewer challenges every assertion
✗ WEAK: "Several users had access issues during the period. Management should improve controls."
✓ STRONG: "1 of 5 (20%) terminations exceeded the 4-hr SLA. jdavis55 was disabled 16.75 hrs after HR termination (Fri 5:00pm → Sat 9:45am). Compensating control: no post-termination logins confirmed via Entra sign-in logs. Root cause: batch sync runs Monday only. Rec: implement real-time Workday-to-Entra sync by Q2."
Solzhenitsyn — "Live Not By Lies" (1974) 10 / 14
Context: Written Moscow, Feb 12, 1974 — the day before his arrest. Circulated as samizdat (underground self-published literature). Written to Soviet citizens under totalitarian rule.

The Central Argument

Totalitarian power sustains itself not through constant overt violence, but through the daily participation of ordinary people in lies.

Violence needs lies to maintain respectability. Lies need violence to be enforced. They are symbiotic.

But violence cannot act on every shoulder every day. All it demands: obedience to lies and daily participation in lies.


The Minimum Path

The "simplest and most accessible key to liberation": personal non-participation in lies.

Not revolution. Not marching into squares. Not hunger strikes. Simply: refuse to say what you do not think.

"The most moderate of all paths of resistance" — easier than Gandhi's civil disobedience. The flames will not touch your body.

Virus Metaphor: Lies are like a virus — they can survive only in a living organism. When people stop participating, the lies are rendered helpless and subside. Withdrawal of participation is the cure.

Key Concepts

ConceptKey Point
Fear hierarchyPeople don't fear nuclear war. They fear acts of civil courage — losing white bread, heating gas, Moscow registration.
Spiritual independence vs. servitudeEvery day: either truth (spiritual independence) or lies (spiritual servitude). No neutral ground.
The code of conductWon't sign/write phrases distorting truth; won't cite out of context to please; will walk out of meetings where lies are told; won't buy publications that distort facts.
CzechoslovakiaUnarmed people with worthy hearts can stand up to tanks. If we are thousands, they cannot stop us all.
Pushkin closing"What use to the herds the gifts of freedom? The scourge and a yoke with tinkling bells." Those who choose comfort over truth deserve their suffocation.
→ IIA Connection: P1 Integrity / Std 1.1. The auditor pressured to "reframe" a finding is doing exactly what Solzhenitsyn warns against — small daily participation in lies. Kant's categorical imperative: if all auditors did this, the profession collapses.
Didion — "On Self-Respect" (1961) 11 / 14
Context: Originally published in Vogue; collected in Slouching Towards Bethlehem. Uses "negative definition" — defines self-respect largely through what it is NOT.

The Central Argument

Self-respect is an internal standard — entirely independent of others' approval or reputation. Its source is character: the willingness to accept responsibility for one's own life.

Self-deception is the most difficult deception. No winning smiles or lists of good intentions work in the well-lit back alley where one keeps assignations with oneself.


Key Concepts

ConceptWhat It Means
Self-respect ≠ approvalHas nothing to do with others' approval — who are, after all, deceived easily enough. Rhett Butler: reputation is what people with courage can do without.
Character"The willingness to accept responsibility for one's own life" — the source of self-respect; sometimes loses ground to more negotiable virtues.
Interminable documentaryWithout self-respect: unwilling audience to endless replay of one's failings, broken promises, gifts wasted through sloth/cowardice.

More Key Concepts

ConceptWhat It Means
Jordan Baker vs. Julian EnglishBaker (dishonest, Great Gatsby) HAD self-respect — made her own peace. English (suicidal, Appointment in Samarra) did NOT. Self-respect ≠ conventional virtue.
Discipline as habitSelf-respect is "a discipline, a habit of mind that can be developed, trained, coaxed forth." Small disciplines represent larger ones — reminders of who we are.
Alienation from selfAdvanced stage: can't say no without drowning in self-reproach. Eventually runs away to find oneself and finds no one home.
Intrinsic worthTo have it = potentially have everything: ability to discriminate, love, remain indifferent. To lack it = locked within oneself, paradoxically incapable of either love or indifference.
→ IIA Connections:
Self-deception → Confirmation bias (P2 Objectivity)
Character/responsibility → P1 Integrity (Std 1.1)
Discipline as habit → P4 Due Professional Care & Husserl's trained attention
Courage of one's mistakes → owning errors in prior work
Milgram — "The Perils of Obedience" (1973) 12 / 14
Context: Stanley Milgram, Yale social psychologist. Published in Harper's Magazine, 1973. Adapted from his book Obedience to Authority. Conducted in response to Hannah Arendt's coverage of the Eichmann trial.

The Experiment — Setup

RoleWho They AreWhat Happens
TeacherNaïve real subjectAdministers shocks; the true focus of the study
LearnerActor / confederateReceives no real shock; pretends to suffer
ExperimenterAuthority figureGives prods: "The experiment requires you continue"

Shock generator: 15–450 volts, labeled Slight → Danger: Severe Shock → XXX. Each subject first receives a real 45-volt sample to confirm authenticity.


Key Findings

Predicted: Psychiatrists forecast only a pathological fringe (~1 in 1,000) would reach 450 volts.

Actual: 25 of 40 subjects (62.5%) obeyed to the maximum 450-volt shock. Results replicated across Yale students, New Haven community members, and internationally (Munich: 85% obedient).

Agentic State: The essence of obedience — person comes to view himself as the instrument of another's will and no longer regards himself as responsible for his actions. Once this shift occurs, all features of obedience follow.

What Reduces Obedience

VariationEffect
Orders given by telephone (not in person)Obedience drops to ~⅓ of normal
Two experimenters give conflicting ordersNo shocks delivered past disagreement point
Two peers disobey first36 of 40 subjects joined and refused
Subject not ordered directly (subsidiary task)37 of 40 continued to highest level — "I only administered the test"

Key Concepts for Exam

ConceptDefinition / Key Point
Banality of EvilArendt: Eichmann not a sadistic monster — an uninspired bureaucrat. Milgram confirms: ordinary people, not sadists, deliver 450 volts out of duty.
Diffusion of responsibilitySubject who only "administers the test" credits responsibility to the person who "actually pulled the switch." Classic in complex organizations.
Physical presence of authorityExperimenter in room → high obedience. Phone orders → obedience drops sharply.
Subjects' motivationNOT sadism — they derive satisfaction from pleasing authority ("proud of doing a good job"), not from inflicting pain.
→ IIA Connections:
Agentic state → auditor who "just follows the manager's direction" on a finding = P1 Integrity failure
Diffusion of responsibility → "The partner signed off" ≠ absolution for the staff auditor
Peer disobedience variation → speak-up culture / IIA Standard on reporting impairments
Milgram + Solzhenitsyn: both show ordinary people enable evil through compliance, not malice
Cross-Essay Synthesis · Readings → IIA Ethics Connections 13 / 14

What All Three Readings Share

  • All locate moral failure in ordinary people yielding to structure/authority/approval — not in monsters
  • Solzhenitsyn & Didion: integrity lives in an internal standard, not external validation
  • Milgram & Solzhenitsyn: ordinary compliance enables large-scale harm — no malice required
  • All three argue the individual retains a choice that determines moral identity

Parallel Mapping

SolzhenitsynDidionMilgramIIA Principle
Non-participation in liesCharacter: accept responsibilityDefying the agentic stateP1 Integrity / Std 1.1
Fear of civil courageSeeking others' approvalObedience to authorityP2 Objectivity — independence
Spiritual independenceIntrinsic worthPersonal moral agencyP1 + P2 together
"Refuse to say what you don't think""Discipline, habit of mind"Peer who disobeys firstP4 Due Professional Care
Virus needs living hostInterminable documentaryDiffusion of responsibilityFraud depends on auditor silence
Heidegger link: Aletheia (unconcealment) = Solzhenitsyn's insistence that truth appear naked before the world. The auditor as agent of unconcealment.

Applied to Audit Practice

Solzhenitsyn → Auditor

Softening a finding = daily participation in lies

Audit manager who removes a finding = the living host the lie needs

Didion → Auditor

Seeking management approval for findings = opposite of self-respect

Confirmation bias = self-deception (most difficult deception)

Milgram → Auditor

"I just followed the partner's direction" = agentic state; no absolution

Speak-up culture = Milgram's peer disobedience variation — one voice changes the room

⭐ The Big Picture (likely exam Q):
All three essays describe what an integrated person looks like — refusing lies (Solzhenitsyn), deriving standards from within not others' approval (Didion), and defying the agentic state to remain a moral agent (Milgram). The IIA's five ethics principles describe this same integrated person applied to audit.

"The unexamined organization is not worth working for." — with apologies to Socrates

Master Quick Reference — Everything on One Card 14 / 14
2024 Standards: 5 Domains · 15 Principles · 52 Standards
I Purpose · II Ethics · III Governing (most changed) · IV Managing · V Performing
IIA Ethics Principles & Philosophers
P1 IntegrityKant's categorical imperative — universal law
P2 ObjectivityHusserl's epoché — bracket assumptions; beware confirmation bias
P3 CompetencyAristotle's phronesis — practical wisdom; use specialists
P4 Due Prof. CareHume — can't test everything; sample intelligently
P5 ConfidentialityBreach once = never candid again
Four C's · Engagement · Key Terms
Four C'sCondition · Criteria · Cause · Consequence
Effort splitPlanning 20-30% · Fieldwork 40-50% · Reporting 15-20%
EQAEvery 5 years · ≥1 active CIA required (Std 12.4)
ConclusionNew 2024 term — replaces "opinion"
Topical ReqsMandatory · Effective 12 months after issuance
CIA Triad
ConfidentialityUnauthorized disclosure → breaches, eavesdropping
IntegrityUnauthorized modification → tampering, MITM, malware
AvailabilityDisruption → DDoS, ransomware, system failures
ITGC Key Facts
Positive testHappy path — did it work when it should?
Negative testGuardrails — did it block what it should?
TODBlueprint — can the control work? (Precision/Completeness/Authority)
Design failCan't work → redesign (don't prescribe training!)
OE failDidn't work → training, monitoring, automation
MWReasonable possibility material misstatement → adverse ICFR opinion
Sig. DeficiencyLess than MW → report to Audit Committee
Census100% — always for privileged users, SoD conflicts
Daily/High40–60 samples (AICPA/PCAOB)
Solzhenitsyn: Non-participation in lies = P1 Integrity. Virus metaphor: lies survive only in living host.
Didion: Self-respect = character (internal). Self-deception = most difficult deception = Confirmation Bias (P2).
Milgram: 62.5% obeyed to 450V. Agentic state = "I'm just an instrument." Diffusion of responsibility. Peer disobedience drops compliance to ~10%. Banality of evil.
All Three: Ordinary people enable harm through compliance/lies/approval-seeking — not malice. Integrated person = refuses all three.

Good luck on the exam!